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DEBARRING FAITHLESS CORPORATE AND RELIGIOUS FIDUCIARIES IN
BANKRUPTCY
LYMAN JOHNSON*
"The only way to do it is take away their livelihood. . . .
Former University of Florida football coach Urban Meyer
INTRODUCTION
The highest officials in both business and religious organizations must be
faithful to the institutions they oversee. This obligation finds legal expression in
fiduciary duties and is rooted in shared social-moral understandings that, for many,
originate in religious teachings. ' The duty of faithfulness, historically and
doctrinally, has been phrased in seemingly strict and demanding terms. 2 Meaningful
sanctions for breaching this stricture, however, are difficult to obtain, and may not
deter high level misconduct, including the kind of conduct leading to organizational
bankruptcy. 3 The result is that faithless fiduciaries not only frequently escape
personal liability for wrongdoing; they are free to repeat their mismanagement
elsewhere.
This article argues that, under specified conditions, bankruptcy courts should be
empowered to debar faithless fiduciaries from holding certain leadership positions,
or engaging in certain behavior, post-bankruptcy. The power to debar, whether for
a brief or lengthy period, theoretically would extend to governing officials in
business, secular nonprofit, and religious organizations, although First Amendment
concerns raise grave (but debatable) doubts about debarment relief in the latter
setting, thereby sharply juxtaposing what law can do to deter faithlessness in secular
and ecclesiastical venues. The authority to debar would be triggered by behavior
that currently may escape sanctioning by state law fiduciary duties, and would
extend to those highest officials who were "substantially responsible" for the failed
condition of the bankrupt organization. The focus of a debar order is not remedial
* Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law; LeJeune
Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis) School of Law. The Frances Lewis
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+ Pete Thamel, College Football's Ugly Season, Facing Scandals of Every Stripe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2011, at Al, A 16. Mr. Meyer was commenting on how to stop college football coaches from violating
NCAA rules-suspend them from coaching..
' See infra Part II.A.2.
2 See infra Part II.A.2.
'See infra Part II.A.2, B.
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but would be forward looking, and would aim to achieve deterrence by outright
prohibition.
Part II of this article describes how faithfulness should be the central and
overarching obligation of fiduciaries, including leaders of business, secular
nonprofit, and religious organizations. The duty of faithfulness is both a legal
stricture and one that, using the Christian religious tradition as just one example,
comports with biblical teachings. Yet secular state law often does not meaningfully
sanction past breaches of duty or effectively deter future misconduct. Part III
describes how several non-bankruptcy legal regimes rectify this shortcoming by
permitting entry of debarment orders under state and federal law. These regimes
can serve as a source of guidance for fashioning debarment relief in bankruptcy.
Part IV advocates debarment authority in bankruptcy through an amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code. The various reasons for permitting debarment relief in a
bankruptcy proceeding will be developed, and the conditions to and permissible
scope of a debarment order will be described. Possible objections to and legitimate
concerns about debarment relief-particularly in religious organizations-will be
considered. As noted in Part IV, some guidance on the degree to which secular law
can regulate the internal governance of religious organizations can be expected
from a case before the United States Supreme Court during its October 2011 term.
The overall aim of this article is to offer fresh thinking on three issues at the
intersection of bankruptcy, organizational governance, religion, and constitutional
law. First, a bankruptcy proceeding need not be only a standalone, single-company
endeavor, but should, in some instances, take note of how other companies might be
affected in the future by the same kind of fiduciary wrong doing seen in the
bankrupt company. Second, bankruptcy law should not have only a remedial
financial focus but should, in part, and under certain circumstances, have a deterrent
governance thrust. Third, the ability of law-in or out of bankruptcy-to deter
governance wrongdoing in religious organizations is exceedingly limited, in
comparison to business and secular nonprofit organizations, although the scope of
secular immunity for harm-causing, high-level ecclesiastical officials is far from
clear. Faithfulness in the ecclesiastical setting might best be achieved by other
means.
I. DEMANDING FAITHFULNESS WITH WEAK SANCTIONS
A. The Seeming Strength of the Faithfulness Norm
The concept of faithfulness is a rich, evocative term with currency both in the
legal sphere and in the social-moral-religious realm. This point will be made,
briefly, by looking at contemporary corporate law and at the ancient teachings of
one faith tradition, Christianity.
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1. Fiduciary Duties
Legally, the highest decision makers in business organizations-i.e., directors
and executive officers-are subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. 4 This
generally is the case as well in non-profit organizations, 5 although the law
pertaining to governing officials of religious organizations, specifically, is less
developed on this point. An excellent illustration of how faithfulness pertains to
legal duties is seen in a 2005 post-trial opinion in the high-profile In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litigation.6 In explicating the duties of care and loyalty, Chancellor
William Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery repeatedly invoked the words
"faithful" and "faithfulness," terms laden with a demanding moral tenor.'
Chancellor Chandler's lengthy introduction, for example, used the words
"faithful" or "faithfully" five times, once as part of the phrase, biblical in origins,
"faithful servants."9 In exploring how the ill-defined concept of "good faith" related
to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, Chandler recast the latter duties as
but constituent elements of the overarching concepts of allegiance,
devotion and faithfulness that must guide the conduct of every
fiduciary. The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes
not simply the duties of care and loyalty, in the narrow sense . . . ,
but all actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders.' 0
The Delaware Supreme Court prominently quoted this language in affirming the
Chancellor's decision." Moreover, numerous earlier Delaware opinions had
4 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30-8.31 (2010) (providing standards of conduct and standards
of liability for corporation directors).
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 8.30-31 (2008) (providing standards of conduct and standards of
liability for directors); see also Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate
Governance - A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors' Fiduciary Duties, _ U. PA. J. BUS. L. -
(forthcoming 2011). Although directors of organizations formed as corporations have specified duties,
members of governing bodies of groups organized in non-corporate form (whether a board of elders or
trustees or a parish council or a presbytery, and so on) also likely owe fiduciary duties. It is less clear,
however, that members of the clergy can be said to owe fiduciary duties, in their capacity as clergy, to a
congregation or to parishioners. See, e.g., Maffei v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Bos., 867 N.E.2d 300, 306
(Mass. 2007) (holding no legal fiduciary duty of priest to congregation). To the extent a clergy member
interacts with third parties, however, he or she is an agent of the organization, and agents owe fiduciary
duties. Moreover, to the extent such a clergy member serves on a governing body of a church-e.g., as a
director of a nonprofit corporation-fiduciary duties would be owed for actions taken in that capacity.
6 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), affid, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 697-99.
8 Id
9 Id at 698; see Matthew 25:21, 23 (using the phrase "faithful servant" twice). The author is not suggesting
that Chancellor Chandler deliberately invoked a scriptural passage. Rather, the point is that that scriptural
passage is so commonplace in everyday and professional discourse that its origins are rarely considered.
10 In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 755.
1" See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 67.
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similarly invoked the concept of faithfulness as central to fiduciary duty.12 For all
the attention given in recent years to the economics of fiduciary duties, 13 legal
doctrine in that area continues to be couched in a decidedly moral grammar.
2. Biblical Teaching
In several places, the Christian Bible commands the quality of faithfulness in
tending to the affairs of others. In Jesus' Parable of the Shrewd Manager,14 in his
Parable of the Talents,' 5 and in his story of the faithful servant, 16 Jesus makes clear
that when working for another, or when entrusted with another's property,
"faithfulness" is required. His famous teaching on a servant being unable to serve
two masters17-a passage regularly cited by judges into the twentieth century 18-
immediately follows a strong teaching on the quality of honest faithfulness that
underlies the narrower behavioral proscription on conflicting loyalties. '9 This
religio-historical antecedent nicely corresponds to Chancellor Chandler's subsuming
of loyalty within an overarching secular conception of faithfulness.20
For purposes of this article, it is interesting to note how, in Christ's parables, he
describes the outcome of faithlessness, the opposite of faithfulness. In the Parable
of the Talents, 21 after the master in that story praises the first two faithful servants
with the phrase "[w]ell done, good and faithful servant," 2 2 he turns to the third, lazy
servant. After severely rebuking him, 23 the master orders that the talent that had
been entrusted to him be taken away and that the servant be thrown outside.2 4 In
other words, the servant lost his current position and was barred from further
service. And we see this as well in the Parable of the Shrewd Manager, where a
rich man's manager who had committed waste was ordered to give an account
"because you cannot be manager any longer."25 He was barred, in other words. The
rationale for this response was provided: "And if you have not been trustworthy
2 See, e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048-49 &
n.16 (Del. 2004); Baring v. Condrell, No. Civ.A. 516-N, 2004 WL 2340047, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2004);
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ. A. 20228-NC,
2004 WL 1949290, at *17 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 & nn.34-35
(Del. Ch. 2003); In re Caremark Int'l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
13 The seminal work is Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
14 Luke 16:1-13.
5 Matthew 25:14-30; see also Luke 19:11-27 (parable often minas).
6 Luke 12:35-48.
"Id at 16:13.
Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L.
27, 53 n.150 (2003).
'9 Luke 16:10-12.
20 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 15.
22 Matthew 25:21, 23; see also supra text accompanying note 9.
23 Id. at 25:26-27 (renouncing servant as wicked and lazy).
24 Id at 25:28-30.
2 5 Luke 16:2.
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with someone else's property, who will [in the future] give you property of your
own?"2 6
The command of faithfulness therefore is forcefully articulated in both human
law and in biblical teaching. It likely finds expression in other religious and moral
traditions as well. Moreover, in biblical teaching there is severe, forward-looking
sanctioning of faithless conduct. It turns out, however, that meaningful sanctions
for breaching legal duties within a corporation are much harder to obtain.
B. Weak Legal Sanctions
With respect to all organizations formed under state law, the fiduciary duties of
those who direct or manage their affairs are governed by state law fiduciary duties,
both before and during bankruptcy. 27 Most top-level business managers are replaced
right before or right after a bankruptcy filing,28 but whoever manages a bankrupt
organization continues to owe state law fiduciary duties. As will be described
below, however, notwithstanding the seemingly strict expression of those duties
noted above, it is exceedingly difficult to sanction high-level decision makers for
conduct leading to an organization's financial distress. The perception of low
personal risk for financial failure (asymmetrically coupled with substantial
incentives for financial success)-i.e., personal upside but no personal downside-
can itself heighten organizational risk.29
Starting with the duty of care, Delaware, the leading corporate law jurisdiction,
has established a loose gross negligence standard as the benchmark for assessing
director conduct. 30 Moreover, this deferential measure has been interpreted as
imposing, essentially, a recklessness standard.3 1 In addition, since 1986, Delaware
has permitted a corporation's certificate of incorporation to exculpate (or absolve)
26 Id. at 16:12. Of course, there are a range of Christian views on the morality of bankruptcy itself, a
subject this article does not address. See, e.g., G. Jeffrey MacDonald, The Moral Burden of Bankruptcy,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (July 3, 2006), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0703/pl3s01-
lire.html (weighing Christian views of both sides of debate over morality of bankruptcy).
27 The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly refer to the Debtor in Possession (DIP) as a fiduciary but, as
with a chapter 11 trustee, case law treats the managers of the DIP in that manner. See Michelle M. Hamer,
The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 486-87
& nn.77-78 (2011) (citing case law holding directors of DIPs have fiduciary duties to creditors and
shareholders). For a business corporation, the board of directors and officers would continue to govern the
business, while for a religious organization, the governing official or body would be that provided for in the
organization's governance system, be that a board of directors/elders/trustees or bishop, etc., as the case may
be.
28 See A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate Reorganizations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 875,
915 (2009) (providing examples of high profile bankruptcy filings where top-level officers were replaced
upon filing).
9 See Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84. S. CAL.
L. REV. 47, 104 (2010) (discussing directors' lack of incentive to better manage risk taking due to
exculpation of directors' personal liability in many Delaware corporations' articles of incorporation).
30 See e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
3 McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274 (Del. Ch. 2009) (defining gross negligence as "reckless
indifference," or actions without reason).
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directors of any personal monetary liability for breaching the duty of care. 32
Furthermore, care is wholly a process-oriented duty; there is no substantive
dimension.3 3 Therefore, even a colossally stupid business decision-or recklessness
in oversight-that causes the financial downfall of a company is not, taken alone,
actionable in a way that will lead to a monetary recovery.34 In addition, heightened
pleading standards, after the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, also make surviving a
motion to dismiss, in or out of bankruptcy, more difficult.36 The upshot is that it is
extremely unlikely that a corporate director will be sanctioned for breaching the
fiduciary duty of care.
As to the duty of loyalty, the prospects for legal sanction are greater, but only in
somewhat narrow circumstances. A director who has a traditional conflict of
interest, wherein he or she unfairly benefits at the expense of the organization, must
answer for the breach, typically by making restitution, a remedy not serving as
much of a deterrent since ill-gotten gain is simply returned.3 9 As to loyalty claims
not involving such conflicts, a director will be personally liable only if he or she
willfully or deliberately engaged in wrongful conduct.4 0 Gross (reckless) neglect of
or inattention to oversight duty is not a loyalty breach. 4 1 As in the duty of care
setting, stupendously wrong-headed or foolish business decisions, taken alone, do
42not constitute breaches of the duty of loyalty, even if they bankrupt a company.
Consequently, unless there is personal wrongful gain or deliberate misconduct,
32 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).
3 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (holding concept of substantive due care "foreign" to
business judgment rule).
34 See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996)) (explaining
judges and juries are "ill-equipped" to evaluate substance of directors' business decisions and accordingly,
business judgment rule is process-oriented).
3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009) (adopting Twombly's strict pleading standard); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007) (rejecting low pleading standard set forth in Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
36 Todd R. David et al., Saving Failed Biz Insiders From Fiduciary Duty Claims, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.law360.com/articles/237901 (examining recent cases). But see Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan
Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 2011) (refraining from addressing Twombly-
Iqbal standard because issue was not fully litigated and adhering to traditional Delaware standard of
reasonable "conceivability").
37 Delaware law does not permit exculpation of directors for breaching the duty of loyalty. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) ("[The certificate of incorporation] shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director . .. [flor any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders . . . .").
38 See Id. (stating director liability cannot be eliminated "for any transaction form which the director
derived an improper personal benefit"); see also Johnson, supra note 18, at 30-33 (discussing development
of 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code).
But see D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1496 (2002) (finding restitution "well-suited to achieving the goal of deterrence that animates fiduciary
duty").
40 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367, 370 (Del. 2006).
41 See id. at 370 (holding bad faith conduct is essential to establish oversight liability).
42 See Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (asserting "mere fact"
decision caused company to suffer some loss does not amount to breach of fiduciary duty "unless the
decision is outside the bounds of any rational business purpose").
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directors do not face the prospect of legal sanctions on the loyalty front, even where
this leads to an organization's failure.43
For corporate officers, there is greater likelihood of personal liability because,
in Delaware at least, officers cannot be exculpated.4 Moreover, it is not yet clear
what the Delaware standard of care is for officers,45 gross negligence only, as with
directors, or simple negligence. Still, given that most misbehaving officers, upon
departing, "settle up" with directors in a way that likely involves a mutual release of
claims,46 they too infrequently face the prospect of paying money damages for their
wrongdoing, although to be sure, their exposure is greater than that of directors.4 7
Even if one believes that fiduciary duties are legally calibrated as they should
be on the personal liability issue, two nagging questions arise nonetheless. First,
does the lack of meaningful legal sanctions for directors (or other organizational
overseers) sufficiently deter them from routinely failing to discharge their duties,
even to the point of risking organizational bankruptcy? Second, even if fiduciaries
are not answerable for damages for past misconduct, is there a way to prevent such
faithless stewards from repeating their mistakes at the expense of another
organization in the future? This is where the possibility of debarment relief comes
in.
II. DEBARMENT ORDERS OUTSIDE BANKRUPTCY
Several federal administrative agencies already are authorized to seek court
debarment orders or impose such orders themselves. These agencies include the
Food and Drug Administration, 48 the Environmental Protection Agency, 49 the
43 See, e.g., In re BH S & B Holdings LLC, 420 B.R. 112, 150 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("A breach of
loyalty claim requires some form of self-dealing or misuse of corporate office for personal gain." (quoting
CVC Claims Litig. LLC v. Citicorp Venture Capital Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 7936(DAB), 2007 WL 2915181, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2007))).
" Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009) (noting absence of statutory provision
authorizing exculpation of officers from monetary liability for breach of duty of care in Delaware). Certain
states do permit exculpation of officers. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (West 2010) (permitting
exculpation ofboth officers and directors).
45 Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS.
LAW. 1105, 1108 (2009) (stating "area of officer duties remains murkier than that of director duties").
46 Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer Liability, 67 Bus. LAW. (forthcoming 2011)
(positing judges will "rarely have to make the determination as to whether an officer did or did not behave
neligently" because directors generally discharge, rather than sue, officers).
Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1597, 1603 (2005) (stating officers, as agents, have fiduciary duties more demanding than
those of directors and thus "rightly face a greater risk of personal liability for misconduct").
48 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 306, 21 U.S.C. § 335a (2006) (mandating Secretary of Health
and Human Services debar those individuals convicted of felony for conduct relating to development or
approval of drug application). As of October 12, 2011, the FDA website listed 103 persons who had been
debarred since 1993. FDA Debarment List (Drug Product Applications),
htt://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/ FDADebarmentList/default.htm.
See 40 C.F.R. § 26.1506 (2011) (proscribing debarment as remedy for violation of regulations); see,
e.g., PPI Aerospace, Inc., EPA S. 01-0185-OOA, 2005 WL 5163071 (EPA GD), at *9 (Nov. 22, 2005)
(ordering one year debarment).
5292011]
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Defense Department,5 0 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 5 ' and the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 5 2 The conditions for imposing bar
orders vary from one regulatory regime to another. Recently, bar orders, although
deployed for niany years, have drawn new attention as part of "a larger Obama
administration effort to pursue individual executives blamed for wrongdoing rather
than simply punishing companies."5 3 When a company is in bankruptcy, moreover,
government efforts to impose monetary sanctions on financially distressed
corporations themselves can reduce the dollar amount of assets available for other
creditors, whereas debarment actions against directors and officers do not have that
effect.54
Perhaps the agency best known for its bar orders is the SEC. Because its
legislative mandate has permitted the SEC since 1990 to bar, specifically, corporate
directors and officers s-the focus of this article-a brief description of that
agency's debarment power is provided here.
When first granted the power to suspend or bar public company directors and
officers from future service in those capacities, conditionally or unconditionally and
permanently or for a shorter period, the SEC had to go to court to procure a bar
order.56 The original statutory grounds were "substantial unfitness" to serve in the
future because of a prior violation of section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act or
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 7 Each of these sections requires scienter, i.e.,
willful or reckless conduct.58 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 altered the standard
s See 2 C.F.R. § 1125 (2011) (establishing process for debarment); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2393 (Supp.
2011) (explaining military secretary cannot subcontract with contractor debarred by another Federal agency);
32 C.F.R. § 32.13 (2008) (stating debarment has effect on contractual relations).
51 See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(2) (2006) (stating Commission may refuse to register or restrict registration of
person for various reasons); see, e.g., Consent Order of Permanent Injunction and for other Equitable Relief
Against Defendants Enrique F. Villalba and Money Market Alternative, LP, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Villalba, No. 1:10-cv-0647-DDD (N. D. Ohio Jun. 2, 2011) (barring from commodity futures
market investment adviser who ran Ponzi scheme).
52 See infra note 56 (detailing SEC's authorization to seek debarment against directors and officers).
5 Alicia Mundy, US. Effort to Remove Drug CEO Jolts Firms, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2011), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704123204576283283851626952.html.
See Kelli A. Alces, Limiting the SEC's Role in Bankruptcy, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 631, 640
(2010) (noting this point for money sanctions, not debarment relief).
The SEC, even before 1990, had the power to bar brokers, investment advisors, and investment
company managers. See Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley,
59 Bus. LAW. 391,409 & n.123 (2004).
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2006) (Securities Act of 1933) (supplying court with power to prohibit violators
of section 77q(a)(1) from acting as officers or directors); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2006) (Securities Exchange
Act of 1934) (arming court with power to prohibit violators of section 77j(b) from acting as officers or
directors). Prior to enactment of these provisions, a court likely had inherent equity power to enjoin service
as an officer or director but such orders were rare. See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 837 F.
Supp. 587, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (illustrating situation in which SEC sought court ordered debarment as
equitable remedy), affd sub nom. SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520, 521 (2d Cir. 1994) (enjoining Victor Posner).
5 See Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. at 613.
58 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695, 697 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197,
201 (1976).
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to that of "unfitness,"5 9 and provided that the SEC may enter a bar order in its own
cease-and-desist administrative law proceeding rather than go to court.60
For several years after passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC continued, for the
most part, to seek bar orders in federal court, not in administrative proceedings.61
The overall use of bar orders increased greatly, however.62 A recent study, for
example, reveals that a significant percentage (39%) of CFOs who are charged with
wrongdoing by the SEC are charged in an administrative proceeding and that, when
legal penalties are imposed on CFOs, a bar order is imposed in more than 54% of
all cases. 63 The SEC also has shown an increased interest in imposing time-limited
bars, typically for five years, not simply permanent bars.64
In short, bar orders play a key role in the sanctioning powers of many federal
agencies. Debarment orders are also available under state law, for directors of both
for-profit and nonprofit organizations, 65 although they are used far less often than
under federal administrative law. Section 8.09(a) of the Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act permits a court to remove a director for having "grossly abused"
his or her position as a director if, considering the adequacy of other remedies,
removal is in the best interests of the corporation.66 Moreover, section 8.09(c) of
that Act authorizes a court to bar a removed director from being reelected or
reappointed.6 7 This section makes no exception for religious organizations, although
in numerous other sections the Model Act crafts special provisions for these types
of corporations. 68 As discussed below, 69 applying section 8.09 to a
5 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 305(a), 116 Stat. 745, 778-79 (2002)
(replacing "substantial unfitness" standard with "fitness" standard in Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch.
404, 48 Stat. 881 § 21(d)(2) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2006)) and Securities Act of
1933, ch. 38, 28 Stat. 74 § 20(e) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(3) (2006))).
6o See id. § 1105, 116 Stat. at 809-10 (adding Securities Act § 8A(f) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
77h-l(f) (2006) and Securities Exchange Act § 21C(f) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78-u-3(f)
(2006))).
61 See Stephen J. Crimmins, Where Are We Going With SEC Officer and Director Bars?, 38 BNA SEC.
REG. & L. REP. 717, 718 (Apr. 24, 2006) (documenting SEC's authority to impose officer and director bars
has gone unused in favor ofjudicial proceedings).
62 See id. at 719 (commenting on increase in SEC officer and director bars from 38 to 170 between 2000
and 2003).
63 See Mei Feng et al., The Role of CFOs in Material Accounting Manipulations, THE CONF.BOARD, May
2011, at 4, available at http://www.conference-
board.org/publications/publicationdetail.cfm?publicationid=1938. The study examined charges against CFOs
from May 17, 1982 through June 10, 2005.
6 See Crimmins, supra note 61, at 721 & nn. 36-37 (mentioning several cases in which time restricted
bars were imposed).
65 See, e.g., MODEL Bus., supra note 4, at § 8.09(c) (describing court procedure for removing and
debarring directors); MODEL NONPROFIT, supra note 5, at § 8.09(c) (giving court authority to remove and
debar directors).
6 MODEL NONPROFIT, supra note 5, at § 8.09(a).
67 Id. at § 8.09(c).
68 See, e.g., id. at §§ 1.60, 8.05, 8.30(0(4), 14.32(f). Section 1.60, moreover, specifically provides that
religious doctrine or canon law, if inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, will control to the extent
required by the U.S. Constitution or the applicable state constitution. Also, the official comment to section
1.50 states that it is "expected ... that courts will use their discretion to avoid becoming overly entangled in
the affairs of religious corporations." Id. at § 1.50.
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director/trustee/elder of a religious organization might be highly suspect on First
Amendment grounds.
Debarment relief has the advantage of sanctioning misconduct while not
depleting the financial resources of companies themselves, whose investor and
creditor constituencies may be unaware of and innocent of wrongdoing. This is of
particular importance if the misconduct created significant financial distress for the
business because government monetary penalties could crowd out private claimants.
And, unlike the case with money damages or civil penalties, bar orders are entirely
forward looking and can pointedly seek to prevent repeat behavior in a specified
setting. But should they be used against high officials in business, much less
religious, organizations whose behavior contributed to bankruptcy?
III. DEBARMENT ORDERS IN BANKRUPTCY
A number of issues must be addressed in considering debarment orders in
bankruptcy. These include: Why is debarment relief in bankruptcy a good idea and
what underlying behavior/legal violation by an officer/director/trustee/elder should
be the predicate offense? What standard-if different than the predicate
wrongdoing itself-must be met to warrant debarment and, if met, what range of
relief might be granted? What concerns and objections might be raised, including
whether debarment is consistent with the purpose of bankruptcy, and who in the
bankruptcy system would be able and motivated to pursue debarment relief? And
how might First Amendment concerns bear on debarment orders in the religious
organization context? These will be addressed in order.
A. The Need and Predicate for Debarment Relief
Currently, an individual bankruptcy debtor who has significantly breached a
fiduciary duty or violated federal or state securities laws may not discharge any debt
arising from that misconduct.70 A person who breaches a fiduciary duty owed to an
organizational bankrupt debtor-but who does not himself or herself enter
bankruptcy-continues to face the possibility of personal liability for that breach7'
but, as noted in Part II, the likelihood of meaningful exposure, particularly for
outside directors, is very small. Thus, post-bankruptcy, the likelihood of future
sanctioning is remote. Moreover, whether or not a fiduciary for an organization
declares personal bankruptcy, he or she is not prohibited from assuming the same or
a similar position as that in which he or she first breached a duty, however
egregious or harm-causing the breach may be. In short, they can do it again.
69 See infra Part IV.D.
'o See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), (6), (19) (2006) (listing fraud, willful or malicious injury, and violations of
securities laws as exceptions to discharge).
7n See Leblanc v. Salem (In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp.), 196 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging it is settled that trustees can be held personally liable for a breach of the duty of loyalty).
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Business and religious organizations face bankruptcy for many reasons. At the
bottom of these varied stories of financial distress lies, in many instances, a failure
of governance. 72 For a church, such as with the Catholic Church, bankruptcy may
stem from widespread, and long ignored, abuse by clergy that results in crippling
financial liability from victims' suits. 7 Or, clergy or other fiduciaries may
embezzle, misuse or illegally "launder" funds.74 From an organizational governance
perspective, the vital question is: Who misgoverned the church or other religious
entity to permit this devastation? In the more common business failure setting,
catastrophic losses may result from poor risk management practices or from
business strategies that ignored obvious or detectable dangers.75
For those fiduciaries who willfully and deliberately engaged in misconduct-as
with abusive priests or disloyal self-dealing executives-breach of fiduciary duty is
clear and should create personal liability to the organization itself for harm caused. 76
Where persons in a more supervisory role are involved, however, such as church
bishops or a lay parish council or directors/trustees/elders, as the ecclesiastical case
may be, it is far less clear that they intentionally misbehaved. Thus, however
derelict they may be in a normative sense, they likely did not breach the legal duty
of loyalty.7 7 Consequently, in being neglectful or careless or reckless, they were
faithless institutional stewards,78 but, legally, it is highly unlikely that they will face
personal liability for their deficient oversight.79
A prime example of such faithlessness comes from the staggering losses
experienced by some of our country's largest financial institutions, such as AIG,
72 See, e.g., In re Roman Cath. Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 BR. 815, 825-26 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005)
(stating evidence of churches' governance policies in response to allegations of sexual misconduct against
priests is relevant to determining churches' liability); Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues For Non-Profit
Religious Organizations, 40 CATH. LAW. 1, 1 (2000) (discussing diocese's attempts to cover up scandal
involving its priests that lead court to hold diocese liable for damages in excess one-hundred million dollars).
73 See Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 363,
363 (2006) (describing bankruptcies of several Catholic dioceses in Washington, Arizona, and Oregon due
to claims for priests' sexual misconduct). Recently, a Catholic bishop and the diocese he leads were
criminally indicted for allegedly covering up abuse by a priest that was known to the bishop. A. G.
Sulzberger & Laurie Goldstein, Catholic Bishop Charged In Priest Abuse Case, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Oct. 15, 2011, at A2. To be sure, other religious institutions also have experienced similar scandals. See
Lipson, Supra at 370 & n.32. And secular nonprofit institutions also can be devastated, reputationally, by
child abuse scandals, as recently seen in the case of Penn State. Kris Maher, Push to Toughen Abuse Law,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2011, at A3.
74 See Pete Brush, NY Rabbi Admits to Laundering Conspiracy, LAW360 (Apr. 08, 2011, 4:10 PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/237857/ny-rabbi-admits-to-laundering-conspiracy (describing illegal money
laundering scheme); see also infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text (describing mismanagement by
founder-directors of various Christian ministries).
7 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (listing companies
who have experienced significant financial harms and losses due to poor corporate governance and
monitoring programs).
76 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
77 Id.
78 Recall that in the Parable of the Talents, the third servant was deemed faithless-and banished-not for
outright disloyalty but for laziness. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup, Bank of America, and so on.80 Although
many companies were spared formal bankruptcy due to the federal government
bailout,81 colossal losses to creditors and investors were not averted. Yet, when, for
example, the directors of Citigroup were sued for breaching their fiduciary duties in
not steering that iconic bank to avoid huge losses on complex, rapidly-sinking
mortgage loans, the judge emphasized the purely process-oriented nature of the duty
of care and dismissed the charges.82 For a care breach, in other words, stupendously
wrong business decisions or persistent strategic blunders simply do not matter.83
Moreover, even if Citigroup directors had breached the duty of care-by being
outright reckless in handling their duties-they would face no personal liability due
to permitted exculpation for such breaches. 84 And if Citigroup had entered
bankruptcy, the directors could continue on in their positions and/or move to other
institutions and recklessly endanger them.
This is disconcerting given that directors, legally, are responsible for an
organization's overall risk management, 8 are to be skeptical of management's rosy
predictions, should monitor industry conditions or retain disinterested advisers who
will do so, and should not assume that management-devised strategies are, or under
changing conditions remain, the best course of action. It is far from clear that
directors and officers at many financially distressed companies fully discharged
their governance and oversight responsibilities in recent years. For example, the
former CEO of Merrill Lynch stated that even its full-time executives (much less its
outside directors) did not understand the perilous positions it was taking prior to
that firm's collapse.86 Professor Alan Blinder, moreover, has observed that "many
so See In re Wilborn, 401 B.R. 848, 856-57 (Bankr. S.D. Tex 2009) (suggesting current financial crisis
caused by lack of company oversight and inattention to risk).
Lawsuits over the financial calamity still are proceeding, however. As just one example, a federal judge
recently ruled that a consolidated securities class action against two Bank of America officers pertaining to
its acquisition of Merrill-Lynch could proceed under federal securities law because scienter was sufficiently
pleaded. In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, and Emp. Ret. Income Sec. Act (ERISA) Litig., No. 09
MD 2058(PKC), 2011 WL 3211472, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011).
82 See supra note 34.
Another example is the decision by top executives at Washington Mutual Bank to make billions of
dollars in risky single-family residential loans to spike profits and receive more compensation. Dan Rivoli,
FDIC To Pursue More Cases Against Failed Banks, LAW360 (Apr. 18, 2011),
http:///www.1aw360.com/articles/239634/print?section=securities. The directors of the bank evidently
acquiesced in this business strategy. The FDIC recently sued the officers but, apparently, not the directors.
Id. Another example-receiving less national attention-but likely typical, involves one of the largest
Chevrolet dealers in the country, Bill Heard Enterprises, which filed under chapter 11. The Trustee sued
directors and officers for continuing to pursue its long-time high volume business strategy of selling
automobiles to subprime borrowers even as the subprime mortgage crisis continued to worsen. Heard v.
Perkins, 441 B.R. 701, 703-04 (N.D. 2010). The claim was rejected under Georgia state law because it
alleged only incompetence, not malfeasance. Id. at 713.
8 See supra note 30-32 and accompanying text.
85 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing
board's management oversight responsibilities).
8 See Martin B. Robins, Pay + Board Composition + Personal Behavior e Corporate Governance: In
Search of Conceptual Change, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 325, 343 & n.60 (2011).
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[boards] were asleep at the switch, with disastrous consequences."87 Investigative
journalist Charles Gasparino has offered a litany of scathing governance reviews
pertaining to the recent crisis. Of bankrupt Lehman Brothers' CEO, Richard Fuld,
Gasparino said: "His board of directors remained silent as his risk taking grew."89
Of virtually bankrupt Bear Stearns, Gasparino observed: "[T]he board barely
debated the firm's risk taking . . . ."90 And, in describing Merrill Lynch and CEO,
Stanley O'Neal, Gasparino says simply: "His board was clueless." 91
Hindsight, which is eschewed in reviewing fiduciary duty breaches but is
wholly legitimate in determining whether someone should continue to serve as a
fiduciary, shows that stunningly bad and avoidable decisions obviously were made
in high places that were bankruptcy-inducing for numerous organizations, business
and religious. When neglect or abdication by fiduciaries leads to bankruptcy,
significant costs are imposed on many persons. 92 Given the small likelihood that ill-
performing fiduciaries will face personal liability, certain of them should at least be
prevented, in fact and symbolically, from repeating their abysmal performance.
Numerous persons who fail in some manner may not be held personally liable for
all the resulting damage, but often they are precluded from future opportunities. In
effect, they are demoted.
In well-performing markets and in organizations with high-functioning
governance systems, creditors and/or vote-holders might be relied on to demand or
effectuate change. That may not always happen, however, and where wrongdoing
is of a certain kind or magnitude, external proscription is appropriate. SEC bar
orders are an example of not relying entirely on shareholder suffrage under state
corporate law to determine who can serve as a director. 9 3
The aim of debarment is not, it bears emphasizing, to impose monetary
sanctions and thereby fulfill victim compensation purposes. The goal, rather, is to
deter; specifically deter by blocking future service in some manner, and generally
deter by inducing other fiduciaries not to mis-perform. For purposes of this article,
the predicate misbehavior for debarment would be a breach of the applicable state
law duty of care, whether negligence or gross negligence (tantamount to
recklessness). This would be a necessary finding for a debarment order but it would
not be sufficient, as addressed in the next subsection.
87 Id. at 356 (alteration in original).
88 See, e.g., Charles Gasparino, Don't Blame Hank Greenberg for AIG, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 3, 2009),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2009/04/03/dont-blame-hank-greenberg-for-aig.html (recounting
interview with former CEO of AIG about the company's collapse).
89 Robins, supra note 86, at 357.
90 Id.
91 Id.92 See, e.g., PERMANENT SUBcOMM. ON INVESTIGATION, 107TH CONG., THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE 3, 11 (Comm. Print 2002) (finding misconduct by Enron's fiduciaries
detrimental to shareholders, employees, and business associates).
9 See supra Part III.
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B. Possible Debarment Standards
In order to face possible debarment under this article's proposal, an
organization's governing fiduciaries, as noted above, must at least have breached
the applicable state law duty of care, but an additional determination also must be
made: is it appropriate, even given the care (or loyalty) breach, to bar this particular
wrongdoer under these circumstances from future service at this organization or at a
similar one? Presumably, by no means will all fiduciary duty breaches
automatically or necessarily lead to debarment. That would be overbroad. Instead,
an additional standard must be met, this one to be provided by bankruptcy law itself
through an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code. Two possible approaches are
sketched.
First, the Code might follow the very recent approach taken by Congress and
the FDIC with respect to "clawbacks" of executive pay at failed financial
institutions. Pursuant to congressional mandate, 94 the FDIC in July 2011 adopted a
rule that, as receiver of a failed institution, it could file an action to recover from
any current or former executive or director "substantially responsible for the failed
condition of the covered financial company" any compensation received during the
two-year period preceding appointment of the FDIC as receiver. 95 A person is
deemed to be "substantially responsible" if he or she failed to conduct his or her
responsibilities with the degree of skill and care an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise under similar circumstances and, as a result,
individually or collectively, caused a loss to the institution that materially
contributed to the failure of the company.96 Moreover, it is presumed, subject to
rebuttal, that certain persons are "substantially responsible" for the failed condition:
the chair of the board of directors, chief executive officer, president, chief financial
officer, or any other person regardless of title if "he or she had responsibility for the
"'97strategic, policymaking, or company-wide operational decisions ....
An alternative approach would be to look to the debarment tests applicable
under federal securities law. Here, either the simple "unfitness" standard could be
adopted,99 with bankruptcy courts developing more detailed standards via case law,
or the Code could adopt, with some modification, a leading test for considering
94 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(s), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(s) (Supp.
2010) (the "Dodd-Frank Act").
9s 12 C.F.R. § 380.7(a) (2011).
96 Id. § 380.7(a)(l)-(2).
9 12 C.F.R. § 380.7(b)(1)(i) (construing executives or directors holding those or similar titles as
presumptively responsible for failed condition of company provided they had decision making
responsibilities). Other presumptions also are set forth in the FDIC rule. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 380.7(b)(1)(ii)
(holding executive or director presumptively responsible for failed condition of company if found liable by
court for breaching duty of loyalty to company).
9 See supra Part Ill.
9 See supra note 59.
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debarment under the federal securities laws. 00 There are six pertinent factors in this
test, including, as modified here from the securities law setting to fit the duty of
care breach standard advocated above: (1) the egregiousness of the underlying
violation; (2) the defendant's "repeat offender" status; (3) the defendant's role or
position in the company; (4) the degree of scienter (here inapplicable as long as the
fiduciary is at least grossly negligent); (5) the defendant's economic stake in the
violation; (6) the likelihood the misconduct will recur.'ot
Courts have emphasized that these factors are not exclusive, and that it is not
necessary to apply all factors to every case. 102 Rather, judges are to have
"substantial discretion" in determining whether someone is "unfit" and, ultimately,
untrustworthy, for future service. 103 One additional factor might be the duration of
the neglect. And, empirical evidence as to recidivistic behavior by governing
officials of bankrupt organizations would be pertinent in a particular proceeding and
would, if showing a pattern of repeated governance failures by high officials,
bolster the debarment proposal.
Other approaches are possible of course. The key point is that where there is a
fiduciary duty breach leading to an organization's financial failure-for whatever
reason, financial or sexual-certain high-level fiduciaries, post-bankruptcy, should
be foreclosed from holding comparable fiduciary posts in the future. This bar may
simply be to prevent them from serving in that particular organization or it might
extend to all organizations in a particular industry. Currently, under section
1 129(a)(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court
shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are
met . . .The proponent of the plan has disclosed the identity and
affiliations of any individual proposed to serve, after confirmation
of the plan, as a director, officer, or voting trustee of the debtor, an
affiliate of the debtor participating in a joint plan with the debtor, or
a successor to the debtor under the plan; and the appointment to, or
continuance in, such office of such individual, is consistent with the
interests of creditors and equity security holders and with public
Policy 104
100 See, e.g., SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 140-41 (2d. Cir. 1995) (adopting six-factor "substantial unfitness"
test used to determine whether defendant should be barred from serving as officer or director of public
company in future).
101 Id. at 141. This test is drawn from an article by Professor Jayne Barnard. Jayne W. Barnard, When is a
Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve"?, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1489, 1492-93 (1992); see also
Barnard, supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting power of SEC to bar brokers, investment advisors,
and investment company managers from serving as officers or directors of public companies).
102 Patel, 61 F.3d at 141
103 Id (stressing courts should have substantial discretion in deciding whether to bar employment in public
companies); see Crimmins, supra note, 61 at 719-20 (indicating application of Patel factors often springs
from judge's moral view that director "has been a central figure in a serious fraud and should not be trusted .
with public trust ever again").
104 11 U. S. C. § 1129 (2006).
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This suggests that, currently, it is important to the success of the future
reorganization-and public policy-to have the right persons in office, and to
foreclose the wrong persons from further service. 0 5 Moreover, only in rare and
extraordinary circumstances should the bar be permanent. More typically, it would
last from one year to five years and perhaps would be coupled with a requirement of
intensive specialized training in fulfilling governance responsibilities and fiduciary
duties. Such a period is long enough to hurt financially and to bring a useful degree
of professional shame, while also permitting word of the debarment order to spread
as a warning to others. The shame factor, of course, will work better in some
organizational settings-one thinks here of religious organizations-than in others
where professional skin is thicker or business mores are more hardnosed. 10 6 The
debarment remedy, moreover, does not visit money damages per se on the
wrongdoer, thereby blunting potential criticisms that it will dissuade persons from
serving in senior governance positions or lead to excessive risk averse behavior for
fear of personal monetary liability, and it does not penalize the company itself and
thereby compete with private creditors for limited organizational funds. Critically,
it is forward looking and preventive in its orientation.
C. Objections; the Debarment Proponent
The most basic objection to this article's proposal likely is that federal
bankruptcy law has an important but relatively narrow aim. In a liquidation, the
objective is to identify and gather all available assets (including monetizable claims
against fiduciaries for wrongdoing) and make an orderly distribution to a firm's
claimants according to a priority system. 107 In a firm's reorganization, the purpose is
to reorganize claims against the debtor in a way that allows the company to move
forward to become productive once again. 0 8 Any sanctioning of wrongdoers that
105 In re Spectrum Arena, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 794, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (disclosure of debtor's manager
designed to insure able and trustworthy management who could successfully operate reorganized
cororation), affd, 46 2 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1972).
The Disney directors and officers were severely scolded and rebuked by Chancellor Chandler in the
Disney litigation. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 762-63 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd,
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("Eisner's actions in connection with Ovitz's hiring should not serve as a model for
fellow executives and fiduciaries to follow. His lapses were many.. . . To my mind, these actions fall far
short of what shareholders expect and demand from those entrusted with a fiduciary position."). The
Chancellor bluntly and publicly chastised them in an effort to warn others occupying fiduciary positions. See
Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REv. 847, 860-64 (discussing Chancellor Chandler's derisive, biting opinion scolding directors
and officers in Disney). Whether such judicial rebuking made a difference at Disney or at other companies is
impossible to know.
107 Alces, supra note 54, at 635.
108 Id at 636; see Lipson, supra note 73, at 378-79 (highlighting bankruptcy law's competing goals of
"preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors").
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does not augment the debtor's estate, the argument runs, simply falls outside the
domain of bankruptcy.' 09
By viewing bankruptcy as a "standalone" single-company legal regime, the
objection has force. But should the occasion of bankruptcy-particularly of large,
systemically significant debtors affecting vast numbers of people or of a religious
entity affecting fewer people but possibly doing so more deeply-be thought of
only in this way? 0 And even as to smaller debtors, if rehabilitation is the aim, part
of that surely involves ensuring that the debtor's top officials don't retrace the
journey into financial distress."' Moreover, although bankruptcy law currently has
a "single firm" focus, perhaps the resolution of a particular reorganization
proceeding should give some heed to whether those who caused dire financial
trouble ought to be free to go elsewhere and repeat their mistakes. In treating
physical illness or disease, for example, we don't simply seek to restore the afflicted
person to good health, we seek to stop the spread of whatever contagion is causing
the problem so as to protect others. Likewise with financial distress, why not halt a
possible reoccurrence by quarantining those who caused it? This is precisely what
debarment orders do under existing non-bankruptcy laws.
Ultimately, resolution of this issue depends on whether bankruptcy should be
viewed in a broader, more economically and financially integrated manner that
takes account of post-bankruptcy effects on other firms where those possible effects
are directly related to a factor substantially contributing to the initial bankruptcy-
faithlessness by fiduciaries. So viewed, in at least some cases-perhaps a small
set-the repercussions of letting those responsible for financial failure blithely
move on to other firms should be considered by a bankruptcy court. In doing so,
and in applying the standards described in Subpart Bll' above, the court would
place special emphasis on the degree of culpability and its duration, consequences,
and likelihood of recurrence.
Even if bankruptcy is a proper venue for a more holistic assessment of fiduciary
responsibility for financial failure, the question arises as to who would raise and
pursue the matter. In the typical chapter 11 proceeding, the organization's
109 But see supra text accompanying notes 104-105.
110 In the early 1990s, Donald Korobkin argued, broadly, that bankruptcy "provides a forum in which
competing and various interests and values accompanying financial distress may be expressed and
sometimes recognized." Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 717, 721 (1991). Consequently, in this normative vision of bankruptcy, "it is a medium by
which the enterprise's moral, political, social and economic aims are defined and redefined." Id. at 772. This
article is not picking up on Korobkin's vision of bankruptcy as such in advancing the debarment concept. But
Korobkin does provocatively open the question as to what the aim(s) of bankruptcy should be.
1i To be sure, evidence suggests that many management teams are changed shortly before or after
bankruptcy. Dickerson, supra note 28, at 915 (reporting empirical studies show officers are replaced in
roughly half of firms about to file, or which have filed, for bankruptcy). It is less clear, however, that non-
employee directors or trustees or other governing officials also change. See also supra text accompanying
notes 104-105.112 See supra Part I.B.
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fiduciaries continue to run the business as the debtor-in-possession ("DIP"). 113
These persons may include some of the faithless fiduciaries themselves and they
obviously would not be motivated to act against their self-interest. And even as to
wrongdoing by former fiduciaries, it is unlikely that current fiduciaries see much
economic gain to themselves or the debtor in seeking debarment relief.
On conversion of a case to chapter 7, the state law fiduciaries are ousted and a
trustee takes over.'4 Moreover, a judge can strip fiduciaries of control, and appoint
a trustee, even in a chapter 11 case. 115 Where there is wrongdoing by current
management, many commentators believe a trustee should be appointed.' 16 Besides
the need for courts to regard directors and trustees as falling within the statutory
term "management," and thereby appointing a trustee where they, as well as
officers, are misbehaving (as by neglect), the problem of incentives for a trustee to
seek debarment relief still remains. A chapter 11 and chapter 7 trustee may be
primarily interested in assembling and distributing assets.
Similar incentive problems arise with committees of creditors and investors,
and with the SEC. Committee duties are listed in Bankruptcy Code section 1103,"
and include consulting with the DIP, investigating the DIP's pre-petition and post-
petition conduct, and participating in the reorganization plan process." 8 Creditors
and investors likely also are focused on maximizing their share of the debtor's
estate," 9 not seeking debarment relief with prospective reach only. Likewise, the
SEC has jurisdiction only over securities law violations, not state law fiduciary duty
breaches. If the SEC believes those involved in the bankruptcy of a public
company should be debarred, it can seek that relief in its own separate
proceedings,1 20 but in doing so it is limited to a federal securities law violation
involving scienter as a predicate offense.121
1 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006) (explicating rights, powers, and duties of DIPs under chapter 11). See
generally John Butler, Jr., et al., Preserving State Corporate Governance Law In Chapter I: Maximizing
Value Through Traditional Fiduciaries, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 337, 341-42 (2010) (observing §
1107 gives DIP broad rights, powers, functions and duties of a chapter 11 trustee).
114 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-704 (enumerating procedures for establishment, election, and line of succession of
chapter 11 trustee, as well as duties trustee must undertake). A bankruptcy court may lack power to convert a
religious organization proceeding to chapter 7. Id. at § 1112(c) (providing that a court may not convert a
case under chapter 11 to a case under chapter 7 if debtor is not a moneyed business or commercial
corporation); Lipson, supra note 73, at 401 & n.206 (remarking bankruptcy courts cannot use chapter 7 to
livuidate a diocese without diocese's consent).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)-(2) (providing for appointment of trustee "for cause, including fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management");
see also Alces, supra note 54, at 642 & n.47 (stating that Bankruptcy Code requires U.S. Trustee to move for
appointment of chapter 11 trustee under specified circumstances). This, however, apparently is rare. Alces,
sufra note 54, at 644 & n.57 (observing appointment of chapter 11 trustees is seen as "last resort").
Butler, supra note 113, at 351 n.61.
17 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (outlining powers and duties of committees).
81 Harner, supra note 27, at 486 (specifying certain duties of committees under section 1103).119 Dennis Klein & Mira Vayda Edelman, Litigating Against Directors and Officers ofBankrupt Dot-Com
Entities: A Potential Asset for the Debtor's Estate, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 803, 803-04 (2002) (noting creditors'
committees maximize recovery for estate).
120 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
121 See supra Part III.
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The best candidate for pursuing debarment relief, under any new congressional
grant of authority, would be an examiner. Currently, appointment of an examiner is
said to be rare,12 2 but some believe it is still overdone.123 Section 1104(c) sets forth
two grounds for the appointment of an examiner,124 each on request of the U. S.
Trustee or a party in interest. 125 One such ground is where the "debtor's fixed,
liquidated, unsecured debts, other than for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an
insider, exceed $5,000,000."126 Thus, under current law appointing an examiner is
not possible in many bankruptcy cases due to the size of debt requirement, but
would be available in all of the more financially significant cases.
An examiner, presumably, is a neutral party able to conduct an independent
review.127 Moreover, section 1104(c)'s language evinces Congress' intention for an
examiner to play an investigatory role.12 8 The examiner's role is
to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate,
including an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the
management of the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former
management of the debtor .... 129
Two points are striking. First, an examiner may investigate the conduct of
former as well as current management.130 Second, the investigation is not limited to
illegal or fraudulent conduct but extends to "incompetence" and
"mismanagement."' 3 ' These terms sweep far more broadly than disloyal or careless
behavior of the sort proscribed by, and actionable under, state fiduciary duties,13 2
and would seem to encompass the sorts of substantively poor strategic, monitoring,
and risk management decisions recently exhibited by many leaders of bankrupt
organizations, both business and religious.13 3 The question naturally arises as to
why an examiner is authorized to investigate for incompetence and mismanagement
122 Alces, supra note 54, at 635 n.15.
123 See Butler, supra note 113, at 350 n.58 (citing authorities arguing that appointment of examiner will
delay proceedings).I I U.S.C. § 1 104(c) (2006).
125 Butler, supra note 113, at 349. The U. S. Trustee is authorized to "raise and may appear and be heard
on any issue in any case or proceeding . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 307. The U.S. Trustee has supervisory duties over
the DIP. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (2006). Given the lack of clear incentives for other parties to seek
debarment-or even appointment of an examiner-in order for debarment relief to be viable, the U.S.
Trustee will have to more assertively seek an examiner where wrongdoing is suspected.
126 11 U.S.C. § I 104(c)(2).
127 In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 284 B.R. 580, 596 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002) (noting Code requires an
examiner to be "neutral" and "disinterested").
Butler, supra note 113, at 350.
129 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c).
130 id
131 id
132 See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 73-76, 81-91 and accompanying text.
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if nothing, sanction-wise, can come of it. Conversely, if incompetence and
mismanagement are pertinent under current bankruptcy practice, once unearthed,
why not, in certain circumstances, 13 4 also make that finding a basis for deterring
such conduct in the future via a debarment order? A determination of
incompetence/mismanagement thus would be germane to the particular bankruptcy
proceeding while also supporting efforts to halt its transmission to other
organizations.
D. Governance ofReligious Organizations and the First Amendment
Religious organizations can file for bankruptcy, 13 5 but as David Skeel has aptly
observed, "church bankruptcy is uncharted waters for a bankruptcy process that is
designed with ordinary business in mind." 136 In the bankruptcy of a religious
organization, there can be a clash of interests between innocent creditors-whether
victims of sexual abuse or financial improprieties-and equally innocent
parishioners who face the prospect of church property being liquidated to pay debts
and, therefore, unavailable for worship, mission, and related activities.m1 7 This clash,
in turn, reflects potential conflict between state law property and organizational
governance rules, typically applicable in bankruptcy, 1 8 and internal governance
provisions (canon law) of the churches themselves, such provisions being entitled,
with somewhat murky boundaries, to constitutional protection under the First
Amendment.139
An instructive example arises from the bankruptcy of certain Catholic dioceses
in conjunction with the well-known priest sex abuse cases. Under canon law, each
parish (even if unincorporated under state law) is considered a separate juridic
entity and, as such, its property, while available to satisfy parish creditors, would
not typically be available to satisfy claims of creditors of other parishes within the
diocese or of the diocese itself, each of which also is a distinct juridic entity.14 0
Under secular state law, however, failure to incorporate a church parish might mean
it is not legally distinct, and that its assets are part of the diocesan estate and fully
available to diocesan creditors. 14 1 Professor Lipson has described how courts have
struggled with this issue.142 More "congregational" church governance structures,
34 See supra Part IV.B.
35 Lipson, supra note 73, at 384.
136 David A. Skeel, Jr., "Sovereignty" Issues and the Church Bankruptcy Cases, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
345, 346 (2005).
37 Lipson, supra note 73, at 365.
See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1978) (holding that, in absence of Congressional
lelislation, state law controls determination of property rights in assets of bankrupt estate).
3 Lipson, supra note 73, at 365-70 (discussing protections of Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses).
140 The author thanks Professor Charles Reid, an expert on canon law at the University of St. Thomas
(Minneapolis) School of Law, for his guidance on these points.
141 Lipson, supra note 73, at 373-74. Likely, after the abuse scandals, parishes and dioceses are being
separately incorporated in an effort to partition the assets of each from the liabilities of other parishes.
Id at 371-77 & n.34 (discussing bankruptcy cases involving diocese liability for priest misconduct).
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where local bodies are more likely to be legally distinct entities, may not face this
risk.
These property disputes reveal an underlying jurisprudential (and jurisdictional)
issue: who makes the governance rules for a religious organization, the organization
itself under canon law, or secular lawmakers, as with business and other nonprofit
organizations? Due to the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, 14 3 the former may be constitutionally required,'" although the scope of that
protection with respect to certain organizational governance matters is far from
clear. If so, then a proposal to amend the Bankruptcy Code to permit a court to
enter a bar order would be unconstitutional, unless it includes an exemption for
religious organizations. This would mean, at a more general level, that secular law
could, with respect to business organizations and secular nonprofit organizations,
but could not, with respect to religious organizations, play a more active role in
preventing governance lapses.
Currently, the contours of judicial deference to canon law largely have been
developed in conjunction with property disputes of the kind noted above and in
employment discrimination cases under Title VII.14 5 Few cases directly address the
interplay of canon law and secular law with respect to non-clergy members of an
organization's governing body, be it, for example, a Catholic parish council or
diocese, a Presbyterian board of elders or presbytery, or a Southern Baptist board of
trustees, although, as noted below, dicta in key cases is quite broad. Nor is it clear
whether governance matters within all "religious organizations" such as primary
and secondary schools, universities, hospitals, and other charities will be treated the
same as governance within churches themselves.
In several decisions addressing property disputes in religious organizations,146
the United States Supreme Court articulated the church autonomy doctrine,
eventually according it constitutional protection. 147 Of especial importance is
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North
143 The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The American Law Institute
currently is sponsoring a project on the Principles of the Law of NonProfit Organizations. Tentative Draft
No. 3, dated April 18, 2011, has noted, in several sections, that for "constitutional and other prudential
reasons . . . attorneys general and courts have curtailed jurisdiction over churches . . . ." A.L.I., PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS., Tentative Draft No. 3, Apr. 18, 2011, Introductory Note, cmt. d, at p. 51.
'" See Lipson, supra note 73, at 365-70 (suggesting First Amendment may offer statutory protections to
religious organizations in bankruptcy).
' Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 (2006); see Thomas C. Berg,
Religious Organizational Freedom and Conditions on Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 165,
215 (2009) (noting "absolute nature" of internal affairs protection).
146 See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russ. Orthodox in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. I (1929); Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. 679 (1871).
147 See Kedroff 344 U. S. at 116 (holding religious organizations have "power to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to
select the clergy . . . must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise
of religion against state interference").
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America.14 8 There, the Court invalidated a New York statute purporting to transfer
control over Russian Orthodox churches in the United States from the Moscow
patriarch to authorities selected by the North American diocese. 149 Although
involving a dispute over property, power over the internal governance and
decisionmaking structure of a church was the real issue, the Court stating that
"[liegislation that regulates church administration, the operation of the churches,
[or] the appointment of clergy . . . . prohibits the free exercise of religion."5 o And,
the First Amendment requires that religious organizations have the "power to decide
for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well
as those of faith and doctrine.""'
Kedroff was expanded on in a 1976 case holding that a civil court had no
authority to hear a suit seeking to force a church to reinstate a defrocked bishop-a
remedy that, essentially, is the opposite of a debarment order. 152 The Court stated
that "questions of church discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are
at the core of the ecclesiastical concern,"'53 and are "not the proper subject of civil
court inquiry."1 54 Religious organizations, in short, are constitutionally protected in
establishing "their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and
government."' 55 Importantly, the Court cautioned against the dangers of judicial
inquiry itself, such as "evaluat[ing] conflicting testimony concerning internal
church procedures," 156 lest the result be judicial "intrusion into a religious
thicket."1 7
The scope of church autonomy over internal affairs, and so church immunity
from legislative and judicial intervention, has received conflicting treatment by
148 344 U.S. 94 (1952). For a full telling of the Kedroff "story," see Richard W. Garnett, "Things That Are
Not Caesar's: The Story of Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral," in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES (Richard W.
Garnett & Andrew Koppelman, eds. 2011).
149 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 108.
'soId at 107-08.
1Id. at 116.
See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976)
(holding First and Fourteenth Amendment preclude courts from inquiring into religious decisions made by
ecclesiastical tribunals).
'5 Id at 717; see also Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (noting "it is
the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and
whether a candidate possesses them").
54 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
55 Id. at 724 (explaining extent of First and Fourteenth Amendment protection for religious organizations).
On "church autonomy," see Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1373 (1981)
("[C]hurches have constitutionally protected interest in managing their own institutions free from
government interference.").
156 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 718.Is? Id. at 719. This "entanglement" theme was reiterated in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490, 502 (1979) ("It is not only the conclusions that may be reached by the [National Labor Relations] Board
which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry
leading to findings and conclusions.").
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federal appeals courts in Title VII employment discrimination cases 158-where,
doctrinally, it is called the "ministerial exception"l 59-and that issue is now before
the United States Supreme Court for the first time. 160 Courts have differed over
whether the focus should only be on which non-clergy employees of a religious
organization are considered "ministers" such that they are not protected by the
nondiscrimination provisions of Title VII.' 6 1 Although that is the approach taken by
many courts-while focusing on a person's functional role within the organization,
not mere ordination l62 -other courts examine more narrowly the nature of the
dispute, not merely the nature of the employee. 6 3
Under the broader approach taken by the majority of circuits, the focus is on
whether an employee's "primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation
in religious ritual and worship." 164 Even this "primary duties" test, however,
necessarily involves judicial assessment of whether an employee's duties are
religious or secular. 16 5 To avoid even that degree of judicial intrusion may require
adoption of the Seventh Circuit's presumption that an employee is "ministerial"
unless he or she functions entirely in a commercial manner.1 6 6 Professors Ira Lupu
and Robert Tuttle, however, argue that permitting judicial determination of which
positions are "ministerial" is no different than judicially applying definitions of
"religion" and "minister" of the sort found throughout the law.167
The Supreme Court has never addressed this issue. During the October 2011
term, it likely will give important guidance on the boundaries of the ministerial
158 See Todd Cole, The Ministerial Exception: Resolving The Conflict Between Title VII And The First
Amendment, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. 703, 729-36 (2010) (describing different judicial approaches).
1 Id. at 704 (stating courts have created ministerial exception). Professor Christopher Lund recently has
sought to ground the ministerial exception doctrine on three components-relational, conscience, and
autonomy. Christopher Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
Judge Richard Posner believes the "minister's exception" is better termed the "internal affairs" doctrine in
recognition of its grounding on avoiding judicial involvement in internal religious matters and in light of the
fact that it encompasses persons who are not ordained ministers. Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d
472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008); Tomic v. Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006).
160 See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School, 597 F.3d 769, 769 (6th Cir.
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011).
161 Cole, supra note 158, at 707-08 (discussing history of ministerial exception).
162 Id. at 707(describing "primary duties" test).
163 Id at 708. Many scholarly commentators are quite critical of the exception and would abolish it or
narrow it. Lund, supra 159, at 5 n.6 (listing authors who have proposed abolishing or substantially
narrowing ministerial exception).
'" Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (detailing
broad approach to ministerial exception).
16s EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding employees' status as
ministers is"a legal conclusion subject to plenary review").
166 See, e.g., Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 477-78 (7th Cir. 2008) (proposing adoption of
ministerial presumption).
67 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious
Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 148 (2009). Professors Lupu and Tuttle argue
that a church congregation's labeling of a position as a "minister" is relevant but should not preclude an
independent judgment about the nature of the position. Id.
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exception in the Title VII context but also perhaps on church autonomy in internal
governance affairs more generally. 168 Title VII cases, however, involve employees
only, not other governing officials within a religious organization. Currently, we
have little direction on how non-employee, non-clergy members of an
organization's governing body-whether hierarchical or congregational-would be
treated if they behaved recklessly in performing their duties, particularly where
secular law and canon law might be at odds. Can a court, bankruptcy or otherwise,
determine what fiduciary duties are owed by those who govern religious
institutions, and whether those duties have been breached, without "intruding" into
a religious thicket? This issue extends to lay members of parish councils, members
of boards of elders or trustees or presbyteries, or other church governing bodies, and
includes persons those who govern organizations with a religious mission (schools,
for example) that are not churches.
Misperformance by these persons may lead the organization itself to harm third
parties, but such higher-level governing officials themselves do not interact with
third parties-as do clergy members or other employees-and therefore they are not
agents of the entity and the entity likely would have no personal liability to a third
party.16 9 Nor is the entity itself directly liable to third parties due to such faulty
oversight, as it is for employee or clergy wrongdoing.170 As a result, third parties
may be harmed by faulty governance, but third parties have no voice in internal
affairs and cannot vote against or otherwise seek to sanction governing officials.
Thus, one rationale for debarment relief in the religious entity setting would be to
prevent harm to third parties who are not part of the religious governance structure
itself. Breakdowns in governance frequently radiate outside an organization rather
than tidily remain within. Governance deficiencies, therefore, while an "internal"
matter for ecclesiastical law in one respect, can nonetheless visit irremediable costs
"externally" of a sort secular law might properly seek to address.' 7'
Certainly, several Supreme Court decisions, including Kedroff and others,172
have used broad language in describing the scope of church autonomy over internal
governance in relation to secular judicial intrusion, 173 but they do not address
supervisory governance specifically. The Supreme Court did affirm the
168 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. For a good discussion of the facts and the Sixth Circuit's
opinion, see Lund, supra note 159, at Part VII.
169 Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp., Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539-40 (Del. 1996) (directors of
corporation are not agents); Doe v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 98
P.3d 429, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (holding church not liable for acts of "High Priest and scout leader" who
was neither an employee, agent, or clergy member).
170 See, e.g., Meyer v. Lindala, 675 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (determining Congregation
had no duty to protect victims from sexual molestation of congregation member because "affirmative duty to
act only arises when a special relationship exists between the parties").
171 Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting Church's "intricate principles of
governance, as to which the state has no rights of visitation").
172 See supra notes 146-157 and accompanying text.
"7 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russ. Orthodox in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)
(declaring Church's "independence from secular control or manipulation").
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appointment of a receiver to liquidate the property of the Mormon Church in the
late nineteenth century,174 as lower courts have done subsequently with respect to
other religious entities.17 5 These cases, moreover, went beyond bar orders merely
prohibiting someone from serving in a governance capacity while leaving the
organization intact, and involved the affirmative appointment of someone from
outside the church to oversee a liquidation proceeding. 176 Winding up an
organization in an effort to end its existence is different, however, than governing
an operating entity. Even in the final termination stage, in 2008, the Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act was revised to provide that, in a dissolution proceeding
for a religious corporation, no receiver or custodian may be appointed. 17 7
Two state court decisions upheld the removal of directors/trustees of religious
organizations. The first, a 2000 North Dakota Supreme Court decision,7 8 upheld
the five-year removal of a director of Help and Caring Ministries, Inc., a nonprofit
corporation which, with affiliated entities, was engaged in a variety of Christian
ministry activities.179 The lower court found that the director-founder had engaged
in significant mismanagement and improper self-dealing. 8 In an action begun by
the North Dakota Attorney General to involuntarily dissolve the entities, the
Supreme Court upheld the director's removal, citing a Wisconsin case rejecting a.
First Amendment free exercise argument by a removed director, 181 even though in
the case before it the director himself had not made a free exercise argument.182 The
Court did not consider the Establishment Clause with respect to the removal
issue, 183 even though elsewhere in the opinion it had extensively addressed that
issue in overturning the trial court order outlining a procedure for reconstituting the
board.184 The North Dakota Supreme Court was troubled by judicial intervention
174 Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 66 (1890).
"7 Lipson, supra note 73, at 402 & n.216.
76 In re United Church of the Ministers of God, 74 BR. 271, 279 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (appointing
trustee from court's panel of Trustee's).
'7MODEL NONPROFIT, supra note 5, at § 14.32(f) (2008). The Model Act does permit dissolution of a
religious corporation, however, even upon the petition of a judgment creditor, id. at § 14.30, but apparently
leaves the dissolution activities in the hands of the organization's governing body, not a receiver or
custodian. The Model Act serves as a model for numerous state statutes. It contains several special
provisions for religious organizations. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
178 State of North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp v. Family Life Services, Inc., 616 N.W.2d 826, 829 (N.D.
2000) (affirming district court's decision to remove director from board for five years).
'79 Id at 829.
180 See generally State of North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp v. Family Services, Inc., No. 96-88, 1999 WL
34758432 (D.N.D. Jan. 25, 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 616 N.W.2d 826, 829 (N.D. 2000) (finding
director-founder comingled trust funds and used corporate property for personal use, among other things).
1 John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795, 801 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814 (1990).(rejecting
directors free exercise argument on grounds that court ordered injunction did not impose burden on director's
ability to exercise Roman Catholicism).
182 Family Life Services, Inc., 616 N.W.2d at 843 (noting director had not made any free exercise
argument).
83 Id. at 842-43 (discussing the removal issue purely on due process grounds).
184 Id. at 837-42 (relying on Establishment Clause analysis for reconstitution issue).
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into affirmatively constituting the governing body, but not by judicial barring of a
wrongdoer from that body.8 5
The second case, from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,186 upheld a judgment
permanently enjoining a founder of a nonprofit corporation formed for religious,
charitable, and educational purposes from serving as a director or trustee.1 87 The
removed director had breached his fiduciary duties and engaged in
mismanagement.188 The appeals court rejected the director's First Amendment free
exercise argument because removal did not interfere with his ability to practice
Roman Catholicism.189 The court did not have before it, nor did it address, however,
an Establishment Clause argument. Consequently, the issue of "entanglement" in a
church's internal affairs under the church autonomy doctrine was not considered.
It might be argued, on the one hand, that by ordering removal, which separates
(rather than elects or reinstates) a director/trustee from governing the organization, a
court is not thereafter "entangled" in the entity's internal affairs. Moreover, removal
of a director under a state corporation law provision presumably would be
predicated on the same neutral, nonreligious grounds for religious organizations as
for business organizations.190 On the other hand, a court must hear evidence of
internal wrongdoing to determine, in the first place, that removal is appropriate.' 9 1
This would clearly seem improper with respect to a clergy member in a church.19 2
Whether the same reasoning would extend to high-level lay members of governing
bodies of churches-or of other non-church but religiously-oriented entities-
depends on the contours of the church autonomy doctrine. These contours,
currently, are unclear.
The Supreme Court may bring greater clarity on this issue in the Hosanna-
Tabor case,19 3 albeit that is a Title VII case involving an employee of a religious
corporation, not a non-employee director or trustee or other governing official.19 4
Permissible secular law inroads into the supervisory governance of religious
organizations will remain murky until more attention is given to the ways in which
governance failures in that setting can adversely affect third parties "outside" the
... Id. at 841.
186 See John, 450 N.W.2d 795.
187 Id at 806 (affirming judgment enjoining founder of corporation which provided financial support for
religious, charitable, and educational causes).
188 Id. at 798 (finding trial court was correct in concluding director's conduct was "gross misconduct").
189 Id. at 801 (stating judgment only brought to conclusion director's relationship with corporation, not his
right to freely exercise his religion).
190 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
191 See, e.g., John, 450 N.W.2d at 799 (stating Wisconsin statute requires "proof or conviction of gross
misconduct").
192 See, e.g., Maffei v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Bos., 867 N.E.2d 300, 306 (Mass. 2007) (dismissing
action predicated on breach of fiduciary or confidential relationship between member of Roman Catholic
clergy and his lay congregants as raising matters of internal church governance that First Amendment
forbids secular court from considering).
193 EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School, 597 F.3d 769, 769 (6th Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011).
194 Id. at 771 (involving teacher's claim against religious school from which she was terminated).
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organization,i9s whether victims of sex abuse or any others harmed as a result of
faulty organizational governance. Preservation of ecclesiastical autonomy over
internal governance is perhaps constitutionally protected only when truly "internal"
affairs are at stake, not when the imposition of costs on parties "external" to that
governance system also must be considered.196 Church and state may not so easily
be separated when the claimed sphere of sovereignty of the one collides with the
sovereign sphere of the other.
CONCLUSION
Today, high-level fiduciaries face little risk of meaningful legal sanctions for
faithless behavior, even when misgovernance leads to organizational bankruptcy.
This is true in business corporations as well as in nonprofit organizations, including
churches and other religious institutions. Debarring certain persons from future
service, as part of administering an organization's bankruptcy proceedings, can
prevent further institution-jeopardizing misperformance while also sending a strong
deterrence message to others.
Doing so requires that bankruptcy law not focus, as now, solely on a single
bankrupt institution's welfare. Instead, future consequences in other institutional
settings should be considered in an effort to avoid repeat, bankruptcy-inducing
behavior. Also, governance considerations, not just financial factors, should play a
more prominent role in certain bankruptcy proceedings where significant
governance breakdown led to financial failure.
Debarment relief in the religious organizational setting raises jurisdictional
questions that remain murky because the appropriate intersection of organizational
governance considerations and First Amendment concerns is undeveloped.
Governance failures here, as elsewhere, however, are not purely "internal" private-
ordering ecclesiastical matters as to which secular courts must necessarily yield.
Rather, misgovemance can radiate outward from religious as well as business
organizations, causing severe damage to third parties who may be unable to hold
legally accountable those faithless governing officials who permitted the
organization to inflict harm.
195 A court may decide not to apply intra-church rules to disputes with third parties. See In re Cath.
Bishops of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 324-25 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005) (refusing to apply intra-church rules
to third party asserting claim against bankruptcy estate). Less clear is what law governs where there is no
"dispute" with a third party but a failure of organizational governance is thought to adversely affect third
parties because of organizational bankruptcy.
196 For example, a federal judge prohibited a lay person from working for any church or church-related
business for twenty-seven months after she violated the terms of her release from prison on tax evasion
charges. She had previously worked as a church secretary and for the National Baptist Convention. Graham
Brink, Edwards guilty of violating her probation, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/28/TampaBay/Edwards guiltyof vio.shtml. Recently, a Ramsey County
District Court Judge in Minnesota amended a "no-contact" order to bar a former church leader from having
contact with anyone younger than age 18. Emily Gurnon, Ex-Church leader admits molesting teen, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 15, 2011, at A7.
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